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ABSTRACT  
With the looming threat of the next hacking scandal, data 
protection efforts in law firms are becoming increasingly crucial 
in maintaining client confidentiality. This paper addresses ethical 
and legal issues arising with data storage and privacy in law 
firms. The American Bar Association’s Model Rules present an 
ethical standard for cybersecurity measures, which many states 
have adopted and interpreted. Other than state legislation 
mandating timely disclosure after a data breach, few legal 
standards govern law firm data breaches. As technology advances 
rapidly, the law must address preventative and remedial measures 
more effectively to protect clients from data breaches caused by 
outdated or ineffective cybersecurity procedures in law firms. 
These measures should include setting a minimum standard of 
care for data security protection and creating a private cause of 
action for individuals whose personal information has been 
improperly accessed because of a failure to comply with those 
standards. 
INTRODUCTION 
 At the intersection of exponentially growing technology and 
online data storage, hacking efforts have increasingly targeted personal 
information stored by large companies stuck in the past. Recently, a 
growing number of companies’ outdated security systems have been 
hacked. Hackers are selling customers’ personal information in mass 
quantities. Law firms have been targeted because their storage of 
confidential information has created an attractive temptation for hackers.1 
There is no set of uniform legal standards for remedying the harms caused 
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by security breaches,2 as legislation has not caught up with technological 
developments and large corporations typically settle cases before trial, 
hindering the development of legal precedent. Nonetheless, some existing 
client confidentiality and professional ethical standards govern the legal 
profession’s interactions with clients. 
 This brief will address the current cybersecurity regulations, and 
lack thereof, on attorneys’ conduct. Traditional lawsuits prompted by data 
breaches have mostly appeared against large corporations like Target or 
Sony.3 Although law firms are hacked as frequently,4 they are not being 
sued, and the details of any consequential data breaches remain hidden 
from the public eye. There is little state-level regulation of data security, 
and federal regulation of data security is nonexistent.5 Massachusetts is 
known for setting a benchmark in data security regulation, but the Office 
of the Massachusetts Attorney General opposed Congress’s attempt at 
enacting The Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2015 which 
would have created nationwide data breach notification standards.6 The 
Attorney General of Massachusetts, Maura Healey, stated that the reason 
for opposition was that a lax national standard, as the law proposed, would 
                                                     
2 Jeff Kosseff, Positive Cybersecurity Law: Creating a Consistent and Incentive-
Based System, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 401, 406 (2016). 
3 See Ahiza Garcia, Target Settles for $39 Million over Data Breach, CNN 
MONEY (Dec. 2, 2015, 5:48 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/02/ 
news/companies/target-data-breach-settlement/; Edvard Pettersson, Sony to Pay 
as Much as $8 Million to Settle Data-Breach Case, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2015), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-20/sony-to-pay-as-much-as-
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(Sept. 22, 2015, 7:16 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/705657/1-in-4-law-
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involving law firms occurred between May 2014 and May 2015). 
5 Another way that law firm data protection is regulated is through their clients’ 
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subject to privacy regulation, such as compliance with the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), if the firms gain access to that data 
and store it, the clients’ privacy responsibilities pass through to their attorneys. 
The right of action is public with only civil and criminal penalties so clients are 
not able to sue law firms for damages caused by noncompliance. Eric A. Hawley, 
Cyber Security and Disaster Recovery Issues for Law Firms, HOUSTON LAW., 
Jan/Feb. 2016, at 18, 19; see also Peter J. Arant, Understanding Data Breach 
Liability: The Basics Every Attorney Should Know, 40 MONT. LAW., Feb. 2015, 
at 8; Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) P.L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1938. 
6 Divonne Smoyer & Kimberly Chow, Q&A with Massachusetts AG Maura 
Healey, INT’L ASSOC. OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (Aug. 23, 2016), https://iapp.org/ 
news/a/qa-with-massachusetts-ag-maura-healy/. 
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undercut the progress that Massachusetts and other states have made 
because the law would preempt state laws with a vague national law that 
leaves consumers unprotected.7  
 This new area of law is constantly evolving and legislation will 
have to catch up to technology to provide proper remedies for victims of 
data breaches caused by lax cybersecurity policies. Recently filed lawsuits 
have begun to creatively address these gaps, but there needs to be a legal 
standard of responsibility that allows claims relating to both preventative 
measures and post-breach accountability to succeed more frequently in 
court. State legislatures should require companies to comply with a 
minimum standard of care and create a private cause of action for 
individuals whose personal information has been compromised as a result 
of noncompliance with that standard. Courts should move toward an 
interpretation of harm caused by data breach as sufficiently imminent to 
pass beyond the threshold of purely speculative harm and confer Article 
III standing. This would provide adequate common law remedies to 
individuals under theories of negligence.  
I. ETHICAL STANDARDS 
 The American Bar Association (“ABA”) has made an effort to 
incorporate cybersecurity into their Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
In 2012, the ABA amended Rule 1.6(c) to state that “[a] lawyer shall make 
reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, 
or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a 
client.”8 Comment 18 of 1.6 enumerates factors to consider in determining 
whether an attorney has made reasonable efforts, but the list is not 
exhaustive.9 The Comment to Rule 1.1 titled “Competence” states that “a 
lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including 
the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.”10 The ABA 
was purposeful in its choice of language to allow the rule to evolve, 
understanding that any specific reference to technology might quickly 
become outdated.11 Many state bar associations have adopted these 
                                                     
7 Id. 
8 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2012). 
9 Id. (“Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s 
efforts include, but are not limited to, the sensitivity of the information, the 
likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of 
employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the safeguards, 
and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to 
represent clients”). 
10 Id. 
11 Myles G. Taylor, Seeing Clearly? Interpreting Model Rule 1.6(c) for Attorney 
Use of Cloud Computing Technology, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 835, 848–49 
(2014).  
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changes into their respective ethical rules.12 The imprecision of the 
“reasonable efforts” language, however, has led to differing 
interpretations.  
 Some of the states that have adopted the 2012 changes or a similar 
variation have issued Ethics Opinions as a guide to interpreting 1.6(c). 
Massachusetts, for example, interpreted the rule in the context of using 
Google Docs for a data storage solution.13 The Committee on Professional 
Ethics determined that Google Docs would be an appropriate storage 
solution if the attorney “undertakes reasonable efforts to ensure that the 
provider’s data privacy policies, practices and procedures are compatible 
with Lawyer’s professional obligations.”14 “Reasonable efforts” include 
examining the provider’s policies and procedures, making sure the terms 
of use prohibit unauthorized access, ensuring that the lawyer has access to 
the data past termination of the use of service, examining the provider’s 
own cybersecurity efforts, and staying up to date with all of the above.15 
Nevertheless, the Committee’s conclusion is unclear. Ultimately, the 
lawyer must use his sound professional judgment to determine whether the 
service is compatible with his ethical obligations.  
 While New York has not adopted the amendments, their Ethics 
Opinion 1019 interprets Comment 17 to Rule 1.616 which states that in 
sending confidential information, “the lawyer must take reasonable 
precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of 
unintended recipients.”17 New York listed four steps to consider in 
determining reasonable care: (1) “[e]nsuring that the online data storage 
provider has an enforceable obligation to preserve confidentiality and 
security”, (2) investigating the provider’s own security measures, (3) using 
available technology to prevent foreseeable infiltration attempts, and (4) 
looking into the provider’s ability to erase data after the business 
relationship is terminated.18  
                                                     
12 See generally CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N 
VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: RULE 
1.6: CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION (2016).  
13 Mass. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 12-03 (2012). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Rule 1.6(c) states that ” [a] lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent the 
lawyer’s employees, associates, and others whose services are utilized by the 
lawyer from disclosing or using confidential information of a client.” MODEL 
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2012). 
17 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 1019 (2014).   
18 Id.  
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 Florida’s ethics opinion on the rule turns to other states’ 
interpretations in addressing cloud computing.19 In particular, Florida 
adopts New York’s list of steps to determine reasonable care.20 It 
emphasizes the practicality of Iowa’s Ethics Opinion 11-01.21 The Iowa 
opinion sets forth questions that lawyers should ask when considering 
using information technology services, including accessibility inquiries on 
access, legal issues, financial obligations, and termination of services, and 
data protection inquiries on password protection, public access, and data 
encryption.22  The Florida opinion adds that the lawyer should consider 
whether additional security measures are necessary in cases of particularly 
sensitive information.23  
 This sampling of interpretations shows the variation among what 
constitutes “reasonable efforts” in each state. There is no consistent 
standard, or even a definitive line to judge attorneys’ behavior with respect 
to data security and confidentiality. Even though ethical rules by nature 
consist of flexible standards, the risk to client confidentiality, a pillar of 
legal ethics, should warrant more predictable standards. It remains to be 
seen how helpful the current standards will be as law firms face a growing 
threat of hacking.    
 II. DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS 
 Forty-seven states have enacted data breach notification statutes.24 
These statutes require governmental, educational and private entities to 
notify affected individuals of data breaches compromising personally 
identifiable information. The statutes vary on which entities must comply, 
the definition of personal information, the definition of a breach, 
notification requirements, and exemptions.25 Despite the inconsistencies, 
these statutes are the closest thing to a universal cybersecurity regulation 
protecting consumers. However, the laws do not mandate preventative 
measures. They mandate notification of data breaches to consumers, 
                                                     
19 See Fla. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 12-3 (2013). 
20 See id.    
21 See id.  
22 See Iowa State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Ethics and Practice Guidelines, Op. 11-01 
(2011).  
23 Fla. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. 12-3 (2013). 
24 See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGS., 
(Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-informat 
ion-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx. 
25 Id. 
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which only becomes relevant after a security breach has already 
occurred.26 Only some states grant a private cause of action.27  
 In terms of notification timing, the statutes range in language from 
“most expedient time possible without unreasonable delay,” to 
“immediately,” to “as soon as reasonably practical,” and to combinations 
of the three phrases. Ohio and Wisconsin give a set limit of 45 days to 
notify consumers of a breach of personal information.28 The statutes of 
California, New York and Texas offer a representative spectrum of data 
breach notification statutes. All three cover unauthorized access to 
personally identifying information, but Texas and California include 
medical data in the definition of personal information.29 Neither New York 
nor Texas offer a private cause of action, but while Texas only allows their 
Attorney General to enforce compliance, New York allows their Attorney 
General to bring an action on behalf of the victims.30 The only penalties 
available in Texas are civil fines and injunctive or equitable relief. New 
York allows both of those along with recovery of consequential financial 
losses to the victim.31 California allows civil remedies, through a private 
cause of action, to customers who were injured by a statutory violation.32  
 Through the enforcement inconsistencies and the fact that the 
statutes only cover consequences from delay of notification—not from the 
actual breach itself—these statutes fail to adequately incentivize entities 
to increase preventative data security measures. 
 Most of the statutes prescribe civil or criminal penalties for failure 
to promptly notify customers. Only 10 states, however, give a private 
cause of action to consumers harmed by the failure to comply with 
                                                     
26 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2016); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 
521.002 (West 2009); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (McKinney 2013); see 
generally State Data Security Breach Notification Laws, MINTZ LEVIN (2016), 
https://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2007/PrivSec-DataBreachLaws-02-07/state_ 
data_breach_matrix.pdf.  
27 Id. 
28 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98 
(West 2008); see generally State Data Security Breach Notification Laws, supra 
note 26. 
29 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82; TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.002; N.Y. 
GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa; see generally State Data Security Breach Notification 
Laws, supra note 26. 
30 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.151; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa; see 
generally State Data Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 26. 
31 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.151; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa; see 
generally State Data Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 26. 
32 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82; see generally State Data Security Breach 
Notification Laws, supra note 26. 
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notification requirements after an unauthorized data access.33 Moreover, 
courts have been reluctant to find injury caused by late notification in 
violation of the statutes.34 While the threat of a penalty might encourage 
companies to adopt stricter cybersecurity measures, most of the statutes 
do little to address the damage caused to consumers.35  
III. STATE STANDARD OF CARE STATUTES 
 A. Overview  
 California is one of the minority of states with standard of care 
laws for businesses maintaining personal information on state residents. 
California Civil Code 1798.81.5(b) states that “[a] business that owns, 
licenses, or maintains personal information about a California resident 
shall implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices 
appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the personal 
information from unauthorized access.”36 This statute also includes a cause 
of action for private citizens who have suffered harm from a violation.37  
 Other states have enacted standard of care statutes, but most are 
enforced through penalties for noncompliance and do not give a private 
cause of action to individuals. For example, in 2015, Rhode Island enacted 
the Identity Theft Protection Act, which requires businesses to implement 
a risk-based information security program that contains reasonable 
procedures and practices.38 Only the Attorney General of Rhode Island, 
however, can bring an action against violating companies if it is in the 
public interest.39 Similarly, in 2010, Massachusetts enacted a statute with 
the purpose of protecting personal information by mandating the adoption 
of a comprehensive information security program by any person who owns 
or licenses personal information about a Massachusetts resident.40 Once 
again, only the Attorney General of Massachusetts may bring an 
enforcement action against a noncomplying person.41 Massachusetts has 
                                                     
33 See generally State Data Security Breach Notification Laws, supra note 26. 
34 See, e.g., Corona v. Sony Pictures Ent’t, Inc., No. 14-CV-09600 RGK, 2015 
WL 3916744 (C.D. Cal. June 15, 2015); Dugas v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts 
Worldwide, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00014-GPC-BLM slip op. (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016); 
In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer Data Sec., 996 F.Supp.2d 942, 965 
(S.D. Cal 2014). 
35 In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer Data Sec., 996 F.Supp.2d at 965. 
36 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b). 
37 Id. 
38 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS. ANN. § 11-49.3-2 (West 2015). 
39 Id. § 11-49.3-5. 
40 201 MASS. CODE. REGS. 17.01–05. 
41 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H § 6 (West 2007). 
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some of the most stringent data breach regulations,42 but even so, public 
enforcement only results in injunctive relief or civil penalties, with no 
relief to the victims of the data breach.43  
 B. Article III Standing 
 The first step in obtaining a remedy for a breach of a state standard 
of care statute is to prove standing under Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution, which requires injury-in-fact.44  Under Article III, “a plaintiff 
must show (1) it has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and 
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; 
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; 
and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will 
be redressed by a favorable decision.”45 Under the Supreme Court’s 
standard in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, a threatened injury 
must be “certainly impending” to constitute imminence in injury-in-fact.46 
The imminence requirement ensures that the alleged injury is not 
speculative or just a claim of possible future injury.47 It is important to note 
that the court’s Article III standing analysis is only a preliminary review 
of the merits of the case; the parties must subsequently litigate the 
substantive issues before any damages can be awarded. 
 An influential decision from the Northern District of California 
abandoned previous courts’ tendency to recognize consumer claims of 
compromised but not misused personal information.48 This case, In re 
Adobe Systems, Inc. Privacy Litigation, determined that plaintiffs had 
standing to bring a class action suit against a corporation for failure to 
maintain reasonable data security under § 1798.81.5(b).49 Threatened 
harm was enough of a defined threat to be considered imminent and 
requiring plaintiffs to wait for hackers to misuse the accessed information 
                                                     
42 Smoyer & Chow, supra note 6. 
43 Lisa M. Ropple, et. al., Massachusetts Adopts Strict Security Regulations 
Governing Personal Information, 2009 PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY L.J., 318, 
324. 
44 U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. 
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000). For further discussion on injury-in-
fact, see infra Part IV.A. 
45 Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180–81. 
46 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). 
47 Id. 
48 Class Actions and Other Security Breach Litigation, 3 E-COMMERCE AND 
INTERNET LAW § 27.07 (2015). 
49 In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F.Supp.3d 1197, 1220 (N.D. Cal. 
2014). 
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weakens evidence of connection between the misused data and the 
defendant.50  
  Dugas v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., after 
similarly granting standing to the plaintiffs, considered the claim that the 
defendant violated their legal duty under § 1798.81.5(b) by failing to 
implement proper security protocols.51 The court found that because the 
plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that Starwood failed to encrypt customer 
data in accordance with reasonable industry standards, they had plausibly 
alleged a cause of action to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss.52  
 Overall, though California establishes a standard of care that 
companies must comply with, it is difficult to establish adequate injury-
in-fact for standing, and even more difficult to properly allege a cause of 
action under the statute. It remains to be seen how courts will construe 
claims of injuries caused by violations of the statute and until then, 
companies (law firms included) will have little incentive to increase their 
data security measures. 
IV. COMMON LAW REMEDIES 
 Customers affected by hacks of large corporations have prevailed 
in claims based on a theory of negligence, which involves duty, breach of 
duty, cause, and evidence of injury. While these cases are often highly 
publicized, most companies reach a settlement agreement before the case 
arrives in court. Claims against law firms, on the other hand, can be sealed 
to prevent exposure of confidential client information.53 Combined with 
the novelty of data breach issues, these circumstances contribute to a 
sparse record of judicial opinions with which to advance the field.  
 A. Article III Standing 
 Negligence and breach of implied contract are the most frequently 
used common law claims for affected individuals to recover damages after 
a data security breach. Prior to evaluating the merits of these claims, courts 
must consider the question of standing under Article III, which requires 
injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability, as described above.54 There 
must have been an invasion of a legally protected interest which is 
                                                     
50 Class Actions and Other Security Breach Litigation, supra note 48, § 27.07. 
51 Dugas v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00014-
GPC-BLM slip op. at 10 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016). 
52 Id. at 10–11. 
53 Allison Grande, Edelson Targets Chicago Law Firm over Lax Data Security, 
LAW360, (May 5, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/793028/edelson-
targets-chicago-law-firm-over-lax-data-security. 
54 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
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particularized and concrete, as well as actual and imminent.55 There must 
be a causal connection between the injury and the claimed wrongdoing.56 
And the injury must be likely to be redressed by a verdict in the plaintiff’s 
favor.57  
 The injury-in-fact requirement has become the main obstacle in 
litigating data breach cases. Multiple courts have dismissed claims for lack 
of standing because the potential risk of identity theft through 
unauthorized access of personal information is not considered an injury-
in-fact.58 As mentioned above, a threatened injury must be “certainly 
impending” to constitute imminence in injury-in-fact.59 In Reilly v. 
Ceridan Corp., the Third Circuit dismissed a claim for damages caused by 
a security breach for lack of Article III standing.60 The court concluded 
that “allegations of hypothetical, future injury are insufficient to establish 
standing” and until the alleged injury actually occurs, the information has 
not been misused and no injury has occurred.61 
 The Ninth Circuit has allowed data breach claims, given that the 
plaintiff faces a credible threat of harm that is real and immediate.62 In 
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had 
“alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the 
theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data” and granted 
Article III standing.63  
 However, the Krottner decision is limited in application. For 
instance, in Antman v. Uber Technologies, Inc., the District Court for the 
Northern District of California held that the plaintiff’s allegations of injury 
were insufficient because only names and driver’s license numbers were 
stolen in Uber’s data breach.64 Even though the court acknowledges that 
                                                     
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Arant, supra note 5, at 10; Stephen J. Rancourt, Hacking, Theft, and Corporate 
Negligence: Making the Case for Mandatory Encryption of Personal Information, 
18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 183, 188–194 (2011). 
59 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). 
60 Reilly v. Ceridan Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3rd Cir. 2011). 
61 Id. at 42. 
62 Id. 
63 Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010). Even though 
the Ninth Circuit granted standing, the court denied that danger of future harm 
without present injury, under Washington law (which does not have a standard of 
care statute with a corresponding private right of action), would support a 
negligence claim.  
64 Antman v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:15-cv-01175-LB, 2015 WL 6123054, at 
*11 (N.D. Cal 2015). 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 244 
Krottner was the relevant precedent for injury-in-fact Article III standing, 
the court stated that “[w]ithout a hack of information such as social 
security numbers, account numbers, or credit card numbers, there is no 
obvious, credible risk of identity theft that risks real, immediate injury.”65  
 Dugas v. Starwood Hotel & Resorts Worldwide, Inc. took an even 
more limited view of Krottner. Because the plaintiff only alleged the theft 
of names, addresses, billing information, and credit card numbers, the 
District Court for the Southern District of California concluded that the 
information stolen was insufficient for a third-party to open up or access 
any personal accounts.66 Therefore, the personal information stolen was 
not in itself sufficient to allege future harm and establish injury-in-fact.67 
Theoretically the affected consumers were safe from unauthorized access 
to their personal accounts. But in reality, stolen information that 
consumers trusted companies to keep private could be used for nefarious 
purposes beyond identity theft through access to personal accounts.68  
 The Fourth Circuit, in Beck v. McDonald, reasoned that mere theft 
is insufficient to confer standing: for the plaintiffs to suffer the potential 
harm claimed, the court must assume that the thief targeted the data for the 
personal information it contained, selected the plaintiff’s specific personal 
information, and successfully used it for identity theft.69 This “attenuated 
chain of possibilities” was too far removed to be certainly impending.70 
The second part of the court’s analysis considered that standing may be 
found when there is a substantial risk of future harm.71 Yet even so, the 
allegation that 33% of health-related data breaches resulted in identity 
theft, assumed to be true, was not enough of a substantial risk to confer 
standing because 66% of those affected would suffer no harm.72  
 Conversely, the Seventh Circuit has recognized a threat of future 
harm or a risk of future harm caused by the defendant’s actions as 
sufficient to support standing.73 Following the Seventh Circuit’s 
                                                     
65 Id. at *10–11. 
66 Dugas v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00014-
GPC-BLM slip op. at 5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016). 
67 Id.  
68 Natasha Bertrand, Here’s What Hackers Do with Your Data, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 
14, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/hackers-are-selling-your-data-in-
highly-sophisticated-black-markets-2014-10. 
69 Beck v. McDonald, No. 15-1395, No. 15-1715, 2017 WL 477781, at *8 (4th 
Cir. Feb. 6, 2017). 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at *9. 
72 Id. 
73 Karen A. Popp & Edward R. McNicholas, Standing to Assert Privacy and Data 
Security Harms, in 12 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL 
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reasoning, the Southern District of California in Dugas recognized, despite 
their limited view of future harm, that another injury that has been 
considered injury-in-fact was “lost time and expenses associated with 
‘mitigat[ing] the actual . . . consequences of the data theft.’”74 Based on 
the Seventh Circuit decision that loss of time by a plaintiff for having to 
mitigate misuse of credit card information constituted injury-in-fact75, the 
court concluded that the plaintiff had Article III standing.76  
 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Company stated that “[w]here a data breach targets personal 
information, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the hackers will use 
the victims' data for the fraudulent purposes alleged in Plaintiffs' 
complaints.”77 Recognizing that it is unreasonable to require plaintiffs to 
wait for actual misuse of their information, the court found that mitigation 
costs constituted actual injury.78 While remedies under these theories 
would be limited, legitimizing mitigation damages would move precedent 
toward recognizing data breaches as causing imminent and quantifiable 
damage to consumers and holding organizations accountable for lax 
security policies.  
 A recent case, Khan v. Children’s National Health System, 
elaborated on a proper allegation of injury-in-fact: the plaintiff must “put 
forth facts that provide either (1) actual examples of the use of the fruits 
of the data breach for identity theft, even if involving other victims; or (2) 
a clear indication that the data breach was for the purpose of using the 
plaintiffs’ personal data to engage in identity fraud.”79 The U.S. District 
Court for the District of Maryland denied standing to the plaintiff under 
not only this theory, but also against the argument that the expense of 
guarding against identity theft was an injury-in-fact. Similarly, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Nevada in In re Zappos.com, Inc., held 
that the purchase of credit monitoring services as a result of breach did not 
constitute injury-in-fact because “in order for costs incurred in an effort to 
                                                     
COURTS § 122:28 (Am. Bar Assoc. Section of Litig. ed., 4th ed. 2016). See 
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to avoid financial loss as constituting injury. Id. 
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77 Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Nos. 15-3386/3387, 2016 WL 4728027, 
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mitigate the risk of future harm to constitute an injury-in-fact, the future 
harm being mitigated must itself be imminent.”80 
 Taking a step back, these cases interpret injury-in-fact for Article 
III standing, which is only the first obstacle to recovery of damages. They 
show that many lawsuits concerning data breaches are not granted Article 
III standing. Even if the courts do grant standing, the parties still have to 
litigate the substantive issues, and the court has to rule for the victim 
plaintiffs before any damages are awarded. However, of the cases granted 
standing, most are not litigated but settled amongst the parties. There may 
be two reasons for settling: (1) litigation costs are high, and (2) with such 
little precedent, the risk of an unfavorable decision for victim plaintiffs is 
too high to forego a definite remedy through settlement. Essentially, the 
result is a dearth of precedent for data breach case, hindering the natural 
development of the law that occurs when courts examine new 
technological issues.  
 B. Common Law Negligence Claims 
 Even if a plaintiff survives dismissal for lack of standing, injury-
in-fact for Article III standing alone does not establish adequately pled 
damages for the cause of action.81 The economic loss doctrine can also bar 
a common-law negligence claim.82 This doctrine states that recovery of 
damages is precluded unless the data breach is accompanied by personal 
injury or property damage.83 And without identity theft or other 
quantifiable harm, courts have not recognized emotional or dignitary harm 
as a personal injury supporting standing under the negligence claim.84 
There is no remedy for data breach victims suffering unquantifiable harm, 
despite the tremendous value society presently places on personal 
information. 
 In Dugas, after establishing adequate injury for standing, the court 
considered the plaintiff’s negligence claim.85 The court stated that “[i]n 
the absence of (1) personal injury, (2) physical damage to property, (3) a 
special relationship existing between the parties, or (4) some other 
common law exception to the rule, recovery of purely economic loss is 
foreclosed.”86 Finding no personal or property injury, and no special 
relationship, the court dismissed the claim.87 While companies can avoid 
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litigation by compensating victims through settlements, victims have 
struggled to receive any judicial remedy for their compromised personal 
information via negligence claims. In these scenarios, victims are 
compensated, but any precedential value the lawsuit may have had for data 
breach negligence claims is lost, leaving an underdeveloped body of case 
law. 
 In the legal profession, claims for breach of the duty to act as an 
ordinary, reasonably prudent lawyer can be presented as the tort of 
malpractice.88 Malpractice claims require the victim to prove the conduct 
fell below the required professional standard.89 These claims, however, 
usually result in monetary damages, determined by actual injury.90 Courts 
likely would not find attorneys liable in unauthorized disclosure cases, 
mainly because of a lack of evidence of actual harm.91 Similarly, 
malpractice damages must be calculated in accordance with other areas of 
law, which requires near certainty of the amount of damages.92 These types 
of cases have done little to influence law firms with respect to their 
cybersecurity policies.93  
 In states without as broad a range of technology based litigation 
as California, the results have been even bleaker. In Louisiana, for 
example, plaintiffs have made claims for negligence, emotional distress, 
loss and invasion of privacy, identity theft, harassment, nuisance, fear and 
anxiety.94 Yet most of these claims are analyzed as negligence claims, 
requiring plaintiffs to show actual harm.95 Even in cases where personal 
information has been compromised, if it has not been used and the plaintiff 
cannot prove concrete damages, the claims will be dismissed as 
speculative.96  
V. CYBER INSURANCE 
 Even though the risk of costly data breach has created a growing 
liability for companies, many courts are holding that commercial general 
                                                     
88 Travis Andrews, Technology & Legal Ethics: The Need for Uniform 
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91 Id. at 198–99. 
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liability (“CGL”) insurance policies do not cover cyber-attacks.97 In 
Zurich American Insurance Company v. Sony Corporation of America, 
Sony tried to enforce coverage of its commercial general liability 
insurance policy after hackers breached its data.98 The Supreme Court of 
New York in New York County refused to expand coverage of a CGL 
policy to cyber-attacks.99 Similarly, attorney professional liability 
insurance policies could have gaps in coverage related to loss of client 
data, recovery, business interruption or cyber extortion threats.100 
Nevertheless, while corporate purchase of cyber insurance has increased 
dramatically in recent years, law firms are slow to follow.101 Cyber liability 
insurance is not only helpful in mitigating the impact of data security 
failure, but it can include pre-breach services, like breach coaches, cyber-
readiness analyses, and security awareness programs.102  
 As the number of lawsuits rises and breach mitigation costs, both 
regulatory and consequential, increase, more firms will likely invest in 
cyber liability policies. If so, this could lead to firms taking a more active 
role in updating their security policies, in accordance with the requisite 
standard of data security outlined by the policy. Noncompliance could 
potentially lead to litigation if insurance companies fail to cover firms that 
do not maintain updated security procedures. In Columbia Casualty 
Company (CCC) v. Cottage Health System, CCC refused to indemnify 
Cottage Health System after a security breach, arguing that its cyber 
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insurance policy covering Cottage Health System required the company to 
adhere to basic security practices, which they failed to do.103 These types 
of preventative security measures, although motivated by the desire to pass 
liability on to insurance companies, can help to reduce the amount and 
magnitude of future breaches.  
 Unfortunately, recent court interpretations of cyber insurance 
coverage have narrowly construed the scope of the policies. In one of the 
first cyber insurance coverage rulings, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Utah held that a cyber liability policy covering losses caused by 
an “errors and omissions wrongful act” does not cover non-negligent 
acts.104 The court’s narrow view that only allegations on a theory of 
negligence are within the scope of the policy contrasts with many prior 
interpretations of CGL coverage.105 Courts have held that CGL insurance 
typically affords coverage for non-negligence claims, based on the theory 
that error or omission incorporates more than negligent conduct.106  
 P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Company 
further showed the holes that cyber insurance policies can have built into 
them.107 Here, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona held that 
P.F. Chang’s cyber insurance policy’s Privacy Injury provision required 
that the compromised information be owned by the claimant.108 P.F. 
Chang’s was assessed over $1.9 million in fees from their credit card 
services intermediary as a result of a data breach.109 But because the 
intermediary did not own the personal information—P.F. Chang’s did—
the insurance policy did not cover P.F. Chang’s claim for reimbursement 
of the intermediary’s assessments.110 The court also found that other 
claims, which would have been covered, fell under the policy’s contractual 
liability exclusion, which lacked customary carve-outs.111  
 These two cases show a very narrow interpretation of the cyber 
insurance coverage provisions, compared to cases construing CGL 
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policies, and highlight two problems. First, cyber insurance policyholders 
must anticipate potential holes in in their policies because a lack of 
industry standard has led to custom carve-outs and unexpected exclusions 
to coverage. Second, without much history of court guidance in 
interpretation, policyholders may be unsure of the scope of their coverage 
and may find out too late, and after much litigation, that a data breach is 
not covered by their policy.  
VI. THE LEGAL FUTURE OF PREVENTATIVE AND REMEDIAL 
MEASURES AMIDST A GROWING THREAT OF DATA BREACH 
 Overall, a significant regulatory gap exists in the area of law firm 
data storage protection. With statutory and common law remedies rarely 
recovering damages for victims of cybersecurity breaches, litigation 
strategies have had to get more creative. In a current case, Shore v. Johnson 
and Bell, a recently unsealed complaint112 revealed claims against a law 
firm for breach of contract, malpractice, unjust enrichment and breach of 
fiduciary duty for not adequately protecting client data from exposure.113 
The complaint seeks injunctive relief and damages through a theory that 
clients have been overpaying for legal services which should have 
included data protection.114 The firm representing the plaintiff appears to 
be seeking improvement in law firm data security efforts and hopefully 
will pursue litigation over settlement. Through their novel theory that 
clients have been overpaying for legal services, monetary damages may 
be more easily quantifiable and as a result, the court may be more receptive 
to recognizing actual injury.  
 In New York, a couple is suing their attorney for using an AOL 
account and failing to use protective measures, leading to malware 
infecting her computer.115 The clients, engaging in a real estate purchase, 
were contacted by cybercriminals pretending to be the property seller’s 
attorney and asked to make a deposit of $1.9 million on the property.116 
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Here, though, because the plaintiffs made the deposit and only recovered 
a portion of the funds, they can make a showing of actual damages. 
 As the number of hacking incidents increases, we will see more 
and more clients of high profile firms without a remedy for the firm’s 
inability to maintain adequate data security. For example, just last year, 
both Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP and Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP 
suffered data breaches.117 When consumer information is stolen from 
credit card companies or retail chains, victims can often show economic 
injury for identity theft or unreimbursed fraudulent purchases. But more 
often law firm data is targeted for information on mergers, patent and trade 
secrets or litigation strategy and does not cause traditional economic 
harm.118 If our judicial system is to hold law firms accountable for out-of-
date cybersecurity practices, we must create a right of action for private 
citizens negatively affected, though not necessarily traditionally 
economically injured, by data breaches. 
CONCLUSION  
 In conclusion, law firm data security is governed by state ethical 
obligations, state data breach notification laws, and minimally enforced by 
malpractice suits. There is no federal standard of regulation, so each 
individual state has had to create and interpret these rules. Because this is 
a new area of law for many courts and large corporations tend to settle 
cases before the litigation stage, legal precedent is not much help in 
evolving the doctrine to encompass new rights that follow technological 
trends. While a vague national standard that preempts state laws would be 
a step backward for consumer protection, a national standard would allow 
corporations and other entities to more easily comply with data security 
standards by eliminating individual nuances of state regulation in states 
where they conduct business. Massachusetts, for example, while in 
opposition to a national law that preempts its more rigorous state 
standards, is in favor of a law that would continue to require breach 
notification to state authorities who would ultimately be responsible for 
enforcement.119 
 Our legal system needs to focus more on preventative measures 
instead of only providing remedies after a breach has occurred, and often 
only when there has been a violation of a data breach notification statute 
or demonstrable damages. If we wait for each individual firm to get hacked 
before determining that its protection measures were inadequate, then 
more and more confidential client information will be exposed before the 
firm has any incentive to update their policies, especially if the only 
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incentive is negative publicity rather than reparations to the injured parties 
or monetary penalties. Courts need to step up, like the court of the 
Northern District of California in Adobe Systems,120 to interpret 
unauthorized access to data as creating a risk of imminent harm, rather 
than purely speculative harm. The legislature needs to step up and enact 
standard of care laws for data protection, giving individuals a private right 
of action to seek damages for businesses’ failure to comply. The law has 
always been slow to catch up to technological advances, but leaving this 
regulatory gap unaddressed could come at a steep price. 
                                                     
120 Even though the case ultimately settled without litigation of the substantive 
issues, precedents legitimizing data breaches as injury-in-fact for Article III 
standing could create a higher risk of litigation for organizations and incentivize 
more rigorous precautionary security measures. 
